After decades of research, billions of dollars in
investments, and vast amounts of energy spent in both
support and protest, the US is now activating its first
defense against long-range missile attack. All signs are
that, by year’s end, Washington finally will have in
place the means to shoot down a ballistic missile fired
at the American homeland.
The Pentagon has set a date for “IDO”—for initial
defensive operations. It is Oct. 1, 2004.
|
To the Rendezvous. An interceptor streaks
from Kwajalein Island Atoll in the Pacific toward
a target in space in this successful Oct. 14,
2002, test of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
System. |
This system will not be the robust “shield” that
President Reagan envisioned on March 23, 1983, when he
startled the nation with a televised address that laid
out his hope for missile defenses. On that occasion,
Reagan spoke of negating the threat of a massive Soviet
nuclear strike with technology that would, in his words,
render nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.”
By comparison, the 2004 version of missile defense
will be quite modest. The system will feature 10
silo-based interceptor missiles in central Alaska and
southern California and a mix of space- and land-based
sensors, all tied together by a vast command and control
network. It probably will be able to defeat, at best, a
handful of intercontinental ballistic missiles, which
would most likely be fired from North Korea.
Even so, the contiguous 48 states, Alaska, and Hawaii
will not stand naked against a missile fired at them in
anger—for the first time in the nuclear age. If
diplomacy fails and the threat of a devastating response
does not dissuade an attacker, the United States can
call on its Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) as a
last line of protection.
Through Thin and Thick
This line admittedly will be thin at first but will
grow thicker and more sophisticated over time, say Bush
Administration officials. It will evolve into a layered
and integrated system geared to defeat missiles of all
ranges fired from anywhere on the globe. The goal is to
protect not only US soil but also large concentrations
of forward-based US troops and assets, as well as
friends and allies.
Will even this thin, initial defensive system be
ready for prime time by the end of 2004?
“Yes,” said Army Maj. Gen. John W. Holly, director of
the so-called Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
element developed by the Pentagon’s Missile Defense
Agency (MDA). The GMD—previously known as the National
Missile Defense system—will form the bedrock of the
overall missile shield.
“We have a lot of challenges ahead of us,” noted
Holly, “but the people working on this program, in
industry as well as government, are the most talented
and dedicated people in this nation, and they are going
to make it happen.”
Holly compared the BMDS that will go on alert this
year to a basic, serviceable Honda automobile. It will
lack the “frills” of later BMDS configurations—which he
equated to the sophisticated Lexus—but it will be
“reliable” and do the basic job well.
Not everyone is convinced that the initial system
will be ready to handle even an unsophisticated North
Korean missile. “They don’t have a Honda yet,” said
Philip E. Coyle, a former Defense Department official.
In general, critics believe the Bush Administration’s
deployment decision has been driven by political
considerations—not by the emergence of mature and proven
capabilities.
Ballistic missile defense has been an urgent DOD
priority ever since the Bush Administration came to
power in early 2001. Under President Bush, Washington
withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,
effective June 2002. Among that pact’s constraints was a
prohibition on defending one’s entire national territory
from missile attack. The intent was to fortify
Soviet–American mutual deterrence by eliminating any
chance that one side might attack first and use defenses
to ward off a weakened counterstrike.
In 1991, however, the Soviet Union vanished, leaving
in its place democratic Russia and a host of former
Soviet republics. The Bush Administration entered into a
new strategic relationship with Russia, anchored by the
Moscow Treaty. It calls for significant reductions in
deployed nuclear forces. Further, the US conducted a new
Nuclear Posture Review, which enshrined missile defense
as one leg of a new US strategic “triad”—along with
nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces and a
more-responsive infrastructure.
Then came the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the US.
The attacks proved to be a defining event for the
nation’s missile defense project. President Bush made
the decision to place the BMDS on alert by December
2004, consistent with the National Missile Defense Act
of 1999 that made it US policy to deploy a system “as
soon as is technologically possible.”
“Sept. 11, 2001, underscored that our nation faces
unprecedented threats, in a world that has changed
greatly since the Cold War,” said the President in a
Dec. 17, 2002, statement explaining his decision.
The Nightmare
A chief concern is that the United States could be
devastated by a nuclear, biological, or chemical attack
carried out with missiles in the hands of states such as
North Korea and Iran or even a stateless terrorist
organization. For the Administration, the issue is not
in doubt. Senior officials have repeatedly argued that
the nation’s adversaries eye these capabilities as an
asymmetric means to check US conventional military power
and coerce Washington or its allies in a crisis.
|
Main Threat. North Korea
said this photo depicts the August 1998 launch of
its first satellite but analysts claim it is the
three-stage Taepo Dong 1 missile. The defense
system is aimed at checking the Taepo Dong family
of missiles. |
The threat is no fantasy. Navy Vice Adm. Lowell E.
Jacoby, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
recently told Congress that North Korea’s Taepo Dong 2
missile “could target parts of the US [meaning Alaska
and Hawaii] with a nuclear weapon-sized payload in the
two-stage configuration. The missile has the range to
target all of North America if a third stage were used.”
In August 1998, North Korea successfully flew its
three-stage Taepo Dong 1 design over Japan. Since then,
North Korea has abided by a self-imposed flight
moratorium. However, in a 2003 report to Congress, the
CIA claimed Pyongyang “may be ready for flight testing.”
Iran, too, is believed to have a covert nuclear
weapons program and is working on ballistic missiles at
a feverish pace; yet its capabilities are not as
advanced as North Korea’s, according to US intelligence
officials.
China, which some in the Administration view as an
emerging threat, also continues to evolve its ballistic
missile fleet.
This new threat environment differs “fundamentally”
from that of the Cold War and “requires a different
approach,” noted a May 20, 2003, White House statement
that sets down Administration policy on missile defense.
“To deter such threats, we must devalue missiles as
tools of extortion and aggression.”
While missile defenses will not replace offensive
strike capabilities, “they are an added and critical
dimension of contemporary deterrence,” the document
stated, and will assure allies and friends and dissuade
adversaries “from pursuing ballistic missiles in the
first instance by undermining their military utility.”
The initial BMDS is clearly intended to check the
emerging North Korean Taepo Dong family of long-range
missiles. Most of the system’s fixed assets will be
positioned in the Pacific Ocean area looking toward East
Asia. Future upgrades will increase the BMDS ability to
deal with missiles launched from other regions, such as
the Middle East.
Now under way is a vast effort to integrate the
operational elements of the defense system with a test
bed that MDA has established in the Pacific. The test
bed builds upon existing BMD test infrastructure at the
Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site at
Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands, Pacific Missile
Range Facility in Hawaii, other sites in and around that
state, and Vandenberg AFB, Calif.
The Test Bed
Before the President’s deployment decision, the
agency’s efforts were concentrated on creating the test
bed so that the agency could conduct robust testing and
evaluation of new and maturing BMD concepts. This
included establishing a base for interceptor missiles at
Ft. Greely, Alaska; expanding a launch site on Kodiak
Island, Alaska, to accommodate BMD target missiles; and
upgrading the Cobra Dane surveillance radar on Shemya
island at the western end of the Aleutian chain. The US
placed the radar on the strategically located island to
monitor Soviet missile launches during the Cold War.
The test bed was to have a limited operational
capability for use in a crisis. In such an emergency,
five test silos at Ft. Greely could have launched their
interceptors in an attempt to bring down a missile.
With the President’s deployment mandate, the agency’s
efforts—and, in particular, Holly’s activities—have
expanded not only to complete the test bed but also to
get in place the operational assets that will remain on
continuous alert. The test bed will support the
operational elements.
At Ft. Greely, the initial plan for five test silos
has morphed into a requirement for six operational silos
that will house GMD’s combat-ready ground-based
interceptor. Similarly, the agency will station four
operational interceptors at Vandenberg, for a total of
10 interceptors on alert at IDO.
The ground-based interceptor consists of a
three-stage booster atop which sits Raytheon’s
Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle. The booster carries the EKV
to a point in space where it detaches and searches for a
missile. Once it has identified the missile’s warhead,
it homes in and smashes it, destroying the warhead by
the sheer kinetic force of the impact.
MDA is pursuing two boosters for the interceptor: the
Lockheed Martin Boost Vehicle Plus (BV Plus) and an
Orbital Sciences design. In November 2003, the agency
announced that the availability of the BV Plus will be
affected by accidents in preparing its solid rocket
propellant.
Originally, MDA planned to field six Orbital Sciences
interceptors at Ft. Greely and four BV Plus interceptors
at Vandenberg. In the wake of the mishaps, the agency is
accelerating the pace of the Orbital booster program. It
is likely that the Orbital booster will be used in all
10 initial interceptors.
“That appears right now to be where we will end up,”
said Holly. Nonetheless, he said, MDA remains
“absolutely committed” to maintaining a dual-booster
strategy. “We will bring Lockheed Martin back on line as
soon as we can start pouring motors again,” he said.
Diversity Needed
The Orbital design is slightly larger and faster. It
flies at about 3.7 miles per second, compared with 3.4
miles per second for the BV Plus, according to MDA.
Orbital’s system made a successful nonintercept flight
test in 2003.
“Having a faster booster and a slightly slower
booster is a very good thing,” said Holly. “If you can
match the right weapon with the target that you are
going after, ... you are much more efficient in your
engagement.”
The US eventually will deploy both types of boosters
at Ft. Greely, said Holly. It also plans to test both
designs from Vandenberg over the Pacific Ocean against
targets launched from Kwajalein and Kodiak. There are no
plans to fire test interceptors from Greely, he noted.
The initial BMDS sensor network will include USAF’s
Defense Support Program infrared early warning
satellites, the enhanced Cobra Dane radar on Shemya, and
an upgraded early warning radar at Beale AFB, Calif.
These systems have limitations. Only a portion of
Cobra Dane’s field of view can pick up North Korean
missile launches. While the Beale radar’s software and
hardware enhancement should be completed by September,
the radar will not have completed all of its operational
testing by then, said Holly.
The system will also rely on forward deployed Navy
Aegis destroyers that have been upgraded with Spy-1
radars. They will offer early target-track data to the
system.
“Launching on Aegis [cues] is absolutely integral to
our approach,” said Holly.
The Navy expects to have three Aegis-equipped
destroyers available for BMDS use no later than Oct. 1.
These will be used for forward based surveillance and
tracking, said Lt. Cmdr. Tate Westbrook, MDA’s deputy
program manager for the Aegis BMD element. By the end of
this year, the Navy will have fitted one Aegis cruiser,
Lake Erie, with up to five Standard Missile (SM-3)
interceptors. Lake Erie will be a dedicated test bed
asset, but will be available for combat in a crisis.
While Aegis tracking data can contribute to the
intercept of a long-range missile, the SM-3 is capable
of engaging only short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles, said MDA officials.
The Army’s Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3)
system is also considered part of the initial BMDS. It
is already serving with forward deployed troops in South
Korea and the Persian Gulf, protecting them from air and
short-range missile threats.
The heart of the BMDS is its vast Command and
Control, Battle Management and Communications network
that will be headquartered at Schriever AFB, Colo.
Fiber-Optic Highways
Connecting the various GMD nodes will be a vast
fiber-optic network spanning the contiguous 48 states
and running underwater to Alaska and then spreading out
over the state. In August 2003, the MDA completed, ahead
of schedule, the 10,000-mile fiber-optic ring for the
continental US. Plans called for a late 2003 completion
of the Alaska ring. Eventually, the network will cover
some 20,000 miles when it incorporates links to nodes
outside the US, said Holly.
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From the Sea. The Navy in
2004 will outfit one Aegis cruiser, USS Lake Erie,
with five Standard (SM-3) interceptors. The SM-3
can engage only short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles. At right, USS Antietam conducts a test
launch of an SM-2. |
In an actual engagement, DSP satellites would pick up
a threat missile’s plume shortly after launch. They
would alert the GMD fire-control network, which would
begin planning an intercept, based on the satellite
data, while simultaneously cuing Cobra Dane, Aegis, and
any other sensors to track the missile.
Upon receiving higher quality track data from these
sensors, operators would launch one or more
interceptors. The radars would continue to track the
target and provide updated data to the kill vehicle once
it deploys in space. This data would come via a
ground-based In-flight Interceptor Communications System
Data Terminal. Using the updates and its own sensors,
the kill vehicle would then acquire the missile’s
warhead, home in on it, and stage a body-on-body
collision. The radars then would assess whether the
warhead had been stopped. If not, the system could
launch additional interceptors.
MDA already has completed much of the construction
work. Next comes installation of new mission equipment.
Last October, MDA conducted a successful test of the
linkages between the GMD fire control and communications
suite, Aegis, and the BMDS command and control setup—the
three major elements that will be present for IDO.
“That was a significant event,” said Holly.
Also in October, the Army activated the brigade of
approximately 200 soldiers that will operate the GMD
element. It is headquartered in Colorado Springs, Colo.
A battalion will be located at Ft. Greely. Training of
these soldiers, who are predominantly Army National
Guard troops, is continuing.
Under the Army’s concept of operations, the battalion
fire direction center at Ft. Greely would launch
interceptors and control the engagement, said Holly. The
brigade headquarters at Schriever will have a duplicate
set of hardware and software to serve as an immediate
backup. Otherwise it likely will be used to do the
planning and prepare the defense for the next potential
attack, he said.
Despite the progress, many tasks remain.
“We have a lot of software development yet to do,”
said Holly. “We have flight testing, ground testing. We
have to complete construction of the facilities. We have
to complete the training of the warfighter. And we need
to go through a series of integration interoperability
checkouts to make sure that the system works as
advertised. We have a great deal to accomplish.”
MDA plans call for carrying out a major integrated
ground exercise with the BMDS operators around April or
May. “This is a significant ground test for us,” said
Holly.
“Everybody focuses on flight testing, ... but we gain
the greatest benefit overall ...from our ground
testing.”
Final Tests
The agency expects to place the first interceptors in
silos in June and will stage four or five flight tests
before the arrival of IDO. To date, the GMD element has
scored hits in five of eight intercept attempts. After
the demonstration flight of BV Plus using motors
finished before the propellant mishap, the agency early
this year will conduct Integrated Flight Test 13b, a
nonintercept test of the Orbital booster out of
Kwajalein. It will carry and deploy a mock EKV as in an
actual mission.
That will be followed by IFT 13c, a nonintercept
phenomenology test that lets BMDS sensors collect data
on certain types of targets. IFT 14 will be an actual
intercept attempt using the Orbital booster, this
spring. IFT 15, another intercept mission, may or may
not occur prior to IDO. IFT 16a will be a “radar
characterization” mission around October. A target
missile launched from Kodiak will fly along the West
Coast so that the Beale radar and an Aegis ship can
assess their upgraded software.
Holly said there will be no time to rest. As soon as IDO
occurs and the system goes on alert, he will be looking
toward a new flight test in November and the next
software upgrades.
MDA plans to have on alert, by the end of 2005, 10
more ground-based interceptors at Ft. Greely. Moreover,
it will have completed an upgrade of an early warning
radar in Britain, along with fiber-optic connections.
It will also integrate into the BMDS a deployable
sea-based X-band radar produced by Raytheon. The agency
considers the radar’s higher resolution capabilities to
be key for distinguishing warheads from decoys or
countermeasures that a missile may also deploy. The
radar will use Adak, Alaska, in the Aleutian chain, as
its home base initially.
A prototype of the Air Force’s Airborne Laser (ABL)
system is also scheduled to be available in 2005. The
ABL is a modified 747 freighter aircraft that features a
megawatt-class directed energy laser in its nose to
shoot down boosting missiles.
MDA plans to incorporate major improvements into the
BMDS on a biennial basis in block increments. The
capabilities that it will field in 2004 and 2005 will be
part of the Block 2004 BMDS.
The agency’s long-term goal is to build a system that
will defeat any missile threat, however sophisticated.
It wants the defense to have multiple shots at a missile
from different angles and during all phases of the
missile’s trajectory—in the boost phase, post-boost as
it traverses space and deploys its payload, and
re-entry.
Having multiple sensors of varying types, such as
infrared or radar, viewing the missiles from different
locations mitigates the chances of being fooled by a
decoy or countermeasure, noted agency officials.
“If you can achieve an integrated, layered defense,
that is a lot harder to overcome and defeat as an attack
strategy than if you have one element to try to
overcome,” said Air Force Maj. Gen. Henry A. Obering
III, MDA deputy director.
Overall, the agency will take both an evolutionary
and a revolutionary approach to incorporating new
capabilities, said Obering.
“We will add [evolutionary pieces to the initial BMDS]
in terms of adding numbers of interceptors ... and
expanding coverage by adding additional sensors,” he
said.
At times, however, “revolutionary” pieces such as the
ABL will be added. “These are pieces that will cause a
giant [leap] in capabilities,” he noted, adding that the
agency must be vigilant in designing the interfaces that
will allow for the easy incorporation of these
revolutionary capabilities into the system.
MDA has no ultimate BMDS architecture in mind, but
will instead continue to build upon the foundation of
the initial system with capabilities that allow it to
stay ahead of the threat and take advantage of the most
promising breakthroughs in technology.
A capability must not be perfected before fielding,
officials say. Rather it must demonstrate a military
utility making it suitable for deployment, said Obering.
Thereafter it can be refined.