Global warming may be bad news
for future generations, but let's face it, most of us
spend as little time worrying about it as we did about
al Qaeda before 9/11. Like the terrorists, though, the
seemingly remote climate risk may hit home sooner and
harder than we ever imagined. In fact, the prospect has
become so real that the Pentagon's strategic planners
are grappling with it.
The threat that has riveted their attention is this:
Global warming, rather than causing gradual,
centuries-spanning change, may be pushing the climate to
a tipping point. Growing evidence suggests the
ocean-atmosphere system that controls the world's
climate can lurch from one state to another in less than
a decade—like a canoe that's gradually tilted until
suddenly it flips over. Scientists don't know how close
the system is to a critical threshold. But abrupt
climate change may well occur in the not-too-distant
future. If it does, the need to rapidly adapt may
overwhelm many societies—thereby upsetting the
geopolitical balance of power.
Though triggered by warming, such change would
probably cause cooling in the Northern Hemisphere,
leading to longer, harsher winters in much of the U.S.
and Europe. Worse, it would cause massive droughts,
turning farmland to dust bowls and forests to ashes.
Picture last fall's California wildfires as a regular
thing. Or imagine similar disasters destabilizing
nuclear powers such as Pakistan or Russia—it's easy to
see why the Pentagon has become interested in abrupt
climate change.
Climate researchers began getting seriously concerned
about it a decade ago, after studying temperature
indicators embedded in ancient layers of Arctic ice. The
data show that a number of dramatic shifts in average
temperature took place in the past with shocking
speed—in some cases, just a few years.
The case for angst was buttressed by a theory
regarded as the most likely explanation for the abrupt
changes. The eastern U.S. and northern Europe, it seems,
are warmed by a huge Atlantic Ocean current that flows
north from the tropics—that's why Britain, at Labrador's
latitude, is relatively temperate. Pumping out warm,
moist air, this "great conveyor" current gets cooler and
denser as it moves north. That causes the current to
sink in the North Atlantic, where it heads south again
in the ocean depths. The sinking process draws more
water from the south, keeping the roughly circular
current on the go.
But when the climate warms, according to the theory,
fresh water from melting Arctic glaciers flows into the
North Atlantic, lowering the current's salinity—and its
density and tendency to sink. A warmer climate also
increases rainfall and runoff into the current, further
lowering its saltiness. As a result, the conveyor loses
its main motive force and can rapidly collapse, turning
off the huge heat pump and altering the climate over
much of the Northern Hemisphere.
Scientists aren't sure what caused the warming that
triggered such collapses in the remote past. (Clearly it
wasn't humans and their factories.) But the data from
Arctic ice and other sources suggest the atmospheric
changes that preceded earlier collapses were dismayingly
similar to today's global warming. As the Ice Age began
drawing to a close about 13,000 years ago, for example,
temperatures in Greenland rose to levels near those of
recent decades. Then they abruptly plunged as the
conveyor apparently shut down, ushering in the "Younger
Dryas" period, a 1,300-year reversion to ice-age
conditions. (A dryas is an Arctic flower that flourished
in Europe at the time.)
Though Mother Nature caused past abrupt climate
changes, the one that may be shaping up today probably
has more to do with us. In 2001 an international panel
of climate experts concluded that there is increasingly
strong evidence that most of the global warming observed
over the past 50 years is attributable to human
activities—mainly the burning of fossil fuels such as
oil and coal, which release heat-trapping carbon
dioxide. Indicators of the warming include shrinking
Arctic ice, melting alpine glaciers, and markedly
earlier springs at northerly latitudes. A few years ago
such changes seemed signs of possible trouble for our
kids or grandkids. Today they seem portents of a
cataclysm that may not conveniently wait until we're
history.
Accordingly, the spotlight in climate research is
shifting from gradual to rapid change. In 2002 the
National Academy of Sciences issued a report concluding
that human activities could trigger abrupt change. Last
year the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland,
included a session at which Robert Gagosian, director of
the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution in
Massachusetts, urged policymakers to consider the
implications of possible abrupt climate change within
two decades.
Such jeremiads are beginning to reverberate more
widely. Billionaire Gary Comer, founder of Lands' End,
has adopted abrupt climate change as a philanthropic
cause. Hollywood has also discovered the issue—next
summer 20th Century Fox is expected to release The Day
After Tomorrow, a big-budget disaster movie starring
Dennis Quaid as a scientist trying to save the world
from an ice age precipitated by global warming.
Fox's flick will doubtless be apocalyptically
edifying. But what would abrupt climate change really be
like?
Scientists generally refuse to say much about that,
citing a data deficit. But recently, renowned Department
of Defense planner Andrew Marshall sponsored a
groundbreaking effort to come to grips with the
question. A Pentagon legend, Marshall, 82, is known as
the Defense Department's "Yoda"—a balding, bespectacled
sage whose pronouncements on looming risks have long had
an outsized influence on defense policy. Since 1973 he
has headed a secretive think tank whose role is to
envision future threats to national security. The
Department of Defense's push on ballistic-missile
defense is known as his brainchild. Three years ago
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld picked him to lead a
sweeping review on military "transformation," the shift
toward nimble forces and smart weapons.
When scientists' work on abrupt climate change popped
onto his radar screen, Marshall tapped another eminent
visionary, Peter Schwartz, to write a report on the
national-security implications of the threat. Schwartz
formerly headed planning at Royal Dutch/Shell Group and
has since consulted with organizations ranging from the
CIA to DreamWorks—he helped create futuristic scenarios
for Steven Spielberg's film Minority Report. Schwartz
and co-author Doug Randall at the Monitor Group's Global
Business Network, a scenario-planning think tank in
Emeryville, Calif., contacted top climate experts and
pushed them to talk about what-ifs that they usually shy
away from—at least in public.
The result is an unclassified report, completed late
last year, that the Pentagon has agreed to share with
FORTUNE. It doesn't pretend to be a forecast. Rather, it
sketches a dramatic but plausible scenario to help
planners think about coping strategies. Here is an
abridged version:
A total shutdown of the ocean conveyor might lead to
a big chill like the Younger Dryas, when icebergs
appeared as far south as the coast of Portugal. Or the
conveyor might only temporarily slow down, potentially
causing an era like the "Little Ice Age," a time of hard
winters, violent storms, and droughts between 1300 and
1850. That period's weather extremes caused horrific
famines, but it was mild compared with the Younger Dryas.
For planning purposes, it makes sense to focus on a
midrange case of abrupt change. A century of cold, dry,
windy weather across the Northern Hemisphere that
suddenly came on 8,200 years ago fits the bill—its
severity fell between that of the Younger Dryas and the
Little Ice Age. The event is thought to have been
triggered by a conveyor collapse after a time of rising
temperatures not unlike today's global warming. Suppose
it recurred, beginning in 2010. Here are some of the
things that might happen by 2020:
At first the changes are easily mistaken for normal
weather variation—allowing skeptics to dismiss them as a
"blip" of little importance and leaving policymakers and
the public paralyzed with uncertainty. But by 2020 there
is little doubt that something drastic is happening. The
average temperature has fallen by up to five degrees
Fahrenheit in some regions of North America and Asia and
up to six degrees in parts of Europe. (By comparison,
the average temperature over the North Atlantic during
the last ice age was ten to 15 degrees lower than it is
today.) Massive droughts have begun in key agricultural
regions. The average annual rainfall has dropped by
nearly 30% in northern Europe, and its climate has
become more like Siberia's.
Violent storms are increasingly common as the
conveyor becomes wobbly on its way to collapse. A
particularly severe storm causes the ocean to break
through levees in the Netherlands, making coastal cities
such as the Hague unlivable. In California the delta
island levees in the Sacramento River area are breached,
disrupting the aqueduct system transporting water from
north to south.
Megadroughts afflict the U.S., especially in the
southern states, along with winds that are 15% stronger
on average than they are now, causing widespread dust
storms and soil loss. The U.S. is better positioned to
cope than most nations, however, thanks to its diverse
growing climates, wealth, technology, and abundant
resources. That has a downside, though: It magnifies the
haves-vs.-have-nots gap and fosters bellicose
finger-pointing at America.
Turning inward, the U.S. effectively seeks to build a
fortress around itself to preserve resources. Borders
are strengthened to hold back starving immigrants from
Mexico, South America, and the Caribbean islands—waves
of boat people pose especially grim problems. Tension
between the U.S. and Mexico rises as the U.S. reneges on
a 1944 treaty that guarantees water flow from the
Colorado River into Mexico. America is forced to meet
its rising energy demand with options that are costly
both economically and politically, including nuclear
power and onerous Middle Eastern contracts. Yet it
survives without catastrophic losses.
Europe, hardest hit by its temperature drop,
struggles to deal with immigrants from Scandinavia
seeking warmer climes to the south. Southern Europe is
beleaguered by refugees from hard-hit countries in
Africa and elsewhere. But Western Europe's wealth helps
buffer it from catastrophe.
Australia's size and resources help it cope, as does
its location—the conveyor shutdown mainly affects the
Northern Hemisphere. Japan has fewer resources but is
able to draw on its social cohesion to cope—its
government is able to induce population-wide behavior
changes to conserve resources.
China's huge population and food demand make it
particularly vulnerable. It is hit by increasingly
unpredictable monsoon rains, which cause devastating
floods in drought-denuded areas. Other parts of Asia and
East Africa are similarly stressed. Much of Bangladesh
becomes nearly uninhabitable because of a rising sea
level, which contaminates inland water supplies.
Countries whose diversity already produces conflict,
such as India and Indonesia, are hard-pressed to
maintain internal order while coping with the unfolding
changes.
As the decade progresses, pressures to act become
irresistible—history shows that whenever humans have
faced a choice between starving or raiding, they raid.
Imagine Eastern European countries, struggling to feed
their populations, invading Russia—which is weakened by
a population that is already in decline—for access to
its minerals and energy supplies. Or picture Japan
eyeing nearby Russian oil and gas reserves to power
desalination plants and energy-intensive farming.
Envision nuclear-armed Pakistan, India, and China
skirmishing at their borders over refugees, access to
shared rivers, and arable land. Or Spain and Portugal
fighting over fishing rights—fisheries are disrupted
around the world as water temperatures change, causing
fish to migrate to new habitats.
Growing tensions engender novel alliances. Canada
joins fortress America in a North American bloc.
(Alternatively, Canada may seek to keep its abundant
hydropower for itself, straining its ties with the
energy-hungry U.S.) North and South Korea align to
create a technically savvy, nuclear-armed entity. Europe
forms a truly unified bloc to curb its immigration
problems and protect against aggressors. Russia,
threatened by impoverished neighbors in dire straits,
may join the European bloc.
Nuclear arms proliferation is inevitable. Oil
supplies are stretched thin as climate cooling drives up
demand. Many countries seek to shore up their energy
supplies with nuclear energy, accelerating nuclear
proliferation. Japan, South Korea, and Germany develop
nuclear-weapons capabilities, as do Iran, Egypt, and
North Korea. Israel, China, India, and Pakistan also are
poised to use the bomb.
The changes relentlessly hammer the world's "carrying
capacity"—the natural resources, social organizations,
and economic networks that support the population.
Technological progress and market forces, which have
long helped boost Earth's carrying capacity, can do
little to offset the crisis—it is too widespread and
unfolds too fast.
As the planet's carrying capacity shrinks, an ancient
pattern reemerges: the eruption of desperate, all-out
wars over food, water, and energy supplies. As Harvard
archeologist Steven LeBlanc has noted, wars over
resources were the norm until about three centuries ago.
When such conflicts broke out, 25% of a population's
adult males usually died. As abrupt climate change hits
home, warfare may again come to define human life.
Over the past decade, data have accumulated
suggesting that the plausibility of abrupt climate
change is higher than most of the scientific community,
and perhaps all of the political community, are prepared
to accept. In light of such findings, we should be
asking when abrupt change will happen, what the impacts
will be, and how we can prepare—not whether it will
really happen. In fact, the climate record suggests that
abrupt change is inevitable at some point, regardless of
human activity. Among other things, we should:
• Speed research on the forces that can
trigger abrupt climate change, how it unfolds, and how
we'll know it's occurring.
• Sponsor studies on the scenarios that might
play out, including ecological, social, economic, and
political fallout on key food-producing regions.
• Identify "no regrets" strategies to ensure
reliable access to food and water and to ensure our
national security.
• Form teams to prepare responses to possible
massive migration, and food and water shortages.
• Explore ways to offset abrupt cooling—today
it appears easier to warm than to cool the climate via
human activities, so there may be "geo-engineering"
options available to prevent a catastrophic temperature
drop.
In sum, the risk of abrupt climate change remains
uncertain, and it is quite possibly small. But given its
dire consequences, it should be elevated beyond a
scientific debate. Action now matters, because we may be
able to reduce its likelihood of happening, and we can
certainly be better prepared if it does. It is time to
recognize it as a national security concern.
The Pentagon's reaction to this sobering report isn't
known—in keeping with his reputation for reticence, Andy
Marshall declined to be interviewed. But the fact that
he's concerned may signal a sea change in the debate
about global warming. At least some federal thought
leaders may be starting to perceive climate change less
as a political annoyance and more as an issue demanding
action.
If so, the case for acting now to address climate
change, long a hard sell in Washington, may be gaining
influential support, if only behind the scenes.
Policymakers may even be emboldened to take steps such
as tightening fuel-economy standards for new passenger
vehicles, a measure that would simultaneously lower
emissions of greenhouse gases, reduce America's perilous
reliance on OPEC oil, cut its trade deficit, and put
money in consumers' pockets. Oh, yes—and give the
Pentagon's fretful Yoda a little less to worry about.
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