In
a few years, the global production of conventional oil
will fall, while the global demand continues to rise.
The resulting shock of this structural oil famine is
inevitable, so great are the dependency of our economies
on cheap oil and, related to the first, our inability to
wean ourselves from this dependency in a short period of
time.
We can
hope to soften the shock, but only if its imminence
immediately becomes the unique reference point for a
general mobilization of our societies, with, as a
consequence, drastic consequences in every sector. The
alternative is chaos. This prospect is based on the work
of the American geologist King Hubbert, who predicted in
1956 the peak in US domestic production of oil in 1970.
This occurred exactly as predicted.
Transposing Hubbert's approach today to other countries
has given similar predictive results: at present, the
production of every giant oilfield -- and only the giant
ones matter -- is in decline, except in the "black
triangle" of Iraq-Iran-Saudi Arabia.
The
Hubbert's peak of the oil-producing Middle East should
be reached around 2010, depending on the more or less
rapid recovery of full Iraqi production and the growth
rate of demand in China.
The
sectors most affected by the steady rise in the price of
crude oil will be, first, aviation and intensive
agriculture, since the price of jet fuel for one, and of
nitrogenous fertilizer as well as diesel fuel for the
other, are directly linked to the price of crude oil.
This will
occur unless stabilizing policies are used -- for a time
and in some other sectors -- to lower taxes on oil as
prices rise. But afterwards ground transport, tourism,
the petrochemical industry, and the automotive industry
will feel the depressive effects of a reduction in the
quantity of oil (depletion). To what extent will this
situation lead to a general recession? No one knows, but
the blindness of politicians and the usual panicked
overreaction of markets allows us to fear the worst.
This
unavoidable prophecy is being universally ignored,
denied, or underestimated. Rare are those who realize
exactly how close and how great is its advent. Michael
Meacher, formerly UK minister of the environment
(1997-2003), wrote recently in the Financial Times
that unless there is a general awakening and decisions
at the planetary scale to bring radical change in the
domain of energy, "civilization will confront the most
acute and no doubt most violent upheaval in recent
history."
If, in
spite of everything, we want to maintain a bit of
humanity in life on Earth in the 2010s, we ought, as the
geologist Colin Campbell has suggested, to call on the
United Nations to agree immediately on the following: to
guarantee that poor countries will still be able to
import a little oil; to forbid oil profiteering; to
encourage saving energy; to promote renewable sources of
energy. In order to attain these objectives, this
universal agreement should impose the following
measures: every State must regulate oil imports and
exports; no oil-exporting country may produce more oil
than its annual depletion, scientifically calculated,
allows; every State must reduce its oil imports to an
agreed-upon global depletion rate.
This
necessary priority granted to physical econometrics will
not suit economists and politicians, especially in
America. No government of the United States has ever
accepted questioning the American way of life. Since the
first oil shock of 1973-1974, every American military
intervention can be analyzed in the light of the fear of
running short of cheap oil. It was, moreover, the
American production peak in 1970 that enabled OPEC to
seize the occasion and cause the first shock, which
coincided with the Yom Kippur War. Countries in the West
then attempted to regain control and conjure away the
specter of shortage, less through energy sobriety than
by means of opening oilfields in Alaska and the North
Sea. In 1979, the Iranian revolution and the second oil
shock once again allowed OPEC to regain preeminence, as
Western economies paid dearly for their thirst for oil
through the recession of subsequent years.
At the
beginning of the 1980s, the financing and arming of
Saddam Hussein to fight Iran was part of the American
reconquest of the price and flow of oil, as was the
cooperation obtained from King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to
increase crude oil exports to the West. That allowed the
oil price crash of 1986, a return of Western growth
through unlimited oil abundance, the extension of the
thirst for energy up to the Iraq wars (1991, 2003) no
matter how many died from them (100,000? 300,000?), no
matter how much they cost ($100 billion? $300 billion?),
by no matter what means (annual Dept. of Defense budget:
$400 billion).
During
these same last fifteen years, the multiple conflicts in
the Balkans had their source and their resolution in the
American desire to keep Russia away from the oil
transport routes from the Black Sea and the Caspian to
the ports on the Adriatic, by way of Bulgaria,
Macedonia, and Albania. Oil geopolitics authorizes any
pact with Islamist devils, from central Asia to Bosnia,
and all the cynical connivances with terrorists, right
up to Tony Blair's recent trip to Libya to allow Shell
to bring its volume of reserves in return for several
hundred million dollars.
The
present American Greater Middle East Initiative is
dressed up in humanitarian and democratic
considerations, but it is nothing but an attempt to get
control once and for all of every source of oil in the
region.
More than
thirty years of worrying about oil has not opened the
eyes of American and European leaders concerning the
energy crisis that is looming just before us. Despite
what René Dumont and the ecologists were saying from the
1974 presidential campaign on, the governments of
industrialized countries have continued and continue to
believe in almost inexhaustible cheap oil -- to the
detriment of the climate and human health, both
perturbed by greenhouse gas emissions -- instead of
organizing a reduction in their economies' reliance on
hydrocarbons.
However,
the oil shock that promises to strike before the end of
the decade is not like the ones that preceded it. What
is at stake this time is not geopolitical, but
geological. In 1973 and 1979, the shortage had a
political origin in OPEC's decision. Then the supply was
restored.
Today, it
is the wells themselves that are declining. Even if the
United States succeeded in imposing its hegemony on all
the oilfields in the world (outside of Russia), their
army and their technology will not be able to prevail
against the coming depletion of conventional oil. In any
case, there is not enough time to replace a fluid so
cheap to produce, so rich in energy, so easy to use,
store, and transport, with so many uses (domestic,
industrial, fuel, raw material...), in order to reinvest
$100 billion in another source of abundance that doesn't
exist.
Natural
gas? It does not have the just-named qualities of oil
and will reach its global production peak in around 2020
-- about ten years after the other peak. The only viable
path is immediate oil sobriety organized through an
international agreement along the lines I have sketched
out above, authorizing a prompt weaning from our
addiction to black gold.
Without
waiting for this delicate international agreement, our
new regional elected officials and our
soon-to-be-elected European representatives should set
for themselves as a top priority the local realization
of these objectives by organizing, on their own
territory, an oil shrinkage. Otherwise, rationing will
come from the market through the coming rise in oil
prices, and then be propagated by inflation, with the
shock reaching every sector. Since the price will soon
reach $100 a barrel, this will no longer be a simple oil
shock -- it will be the end of the world as we know it.
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